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Abstract
We consider a signaling model with a good and a bad type of Þrm. The
market does à priori not know the Þrms type. The Þrms, which are run by
equally qualiÞed managers, can use their debt level to signal their true value
to the market. In addition to debt, the manager chooses his effort level, which
directly affects the Þrms product market returns. The effort choice interacts
with the signaling mechanism of debt issue and affects the equilibrium debt
level. As a result, it is not always possible to derive the type of Þrm from its
capital structure.
JEL ClassiÞcation: G32, D82, J33
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1 Introduction
The existing literature on signaling with capital structure, both on the theoretical and
on the empirical side, is well developed. Besides the debt level, Þrms can use dividend
policy, management share ownership schemes as well as investment decisions for sig-
naling. The information asymmetry refers either to the assets-in-place or the Þrms
growth opportunities, and there can be uncertainty about the mean or the variance of
these values.
Ravid and Sarig (1991), for instance, consider a model in which Þrms use debt
service obligations and dividends to signal their quality. They demonstrate that higher
valued Þrms, which are characterized by a higher mean of their cash ßow, are more
highly leveraged and pay more dividends than lower valued Þrms. These results stand
in line with most other signaling models.1
More recent work by Brick et al. (1998), however, arrives to the opposite result. In
their model with debt and dividends as signaling mechanisms, Þrms differ with respect
to the volatility of their cash ßow.2 Higher valued Þrms have a lower cash ßow variance
than the lower valued ones. A high cash ßow variance is bad since it is negatively
related to the tax beneÞts of debt issue. DeÞning the Þrm type as a function of second
rather than of Þrst moments results in a lower leverage of the higher valued Þrms.
This result questions the usefulness of Þnancial policy as a signaling mechanism since
it becomes more difficult to deduce the Þrm type from its signaling variables.
The traditional debt signaling models have been widely tested with Þrm data.3
The empirical evidence, however, reveals a very inconclusive picture. The results are
often not compatible with what the theoretical models predict, i.e., most studies Þnd
no systematic relationship, neither positive nor negative, between a Þrms announced
change in leverage and its market valuation.
All these signaling models are in the tradition of classical Þnancial theory. The un-
derlying assumption is that the choice of the Þnancial structure is independent of other
decisions the management of a Þrm faces. Accordingly, the product market returns are
1Classical papers on signaling with capital structure and dividend payments include, e.g., Ross
(1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bhattacharya. See also Luo et al. (2002) for an overview of
signaling models.
2In most other work the quality of the Þrm is deÞned with respect to the mean of the cash ßow.
3See for example Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch
(1986), Eckbo (1986).
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exogenously given and independent of the capital structure choice. Since the pioneer-
ing work of Brander&Lewis (1986), however, we know that the choice of the Þnancial
structure interacts with other strategic decisions of the Þrm.4 More importantly, these
models do not take into account any frictions which can arise between the separation
of ownership and control within a Þrm, i.e., the role of the manager and the related
agency conßict are not explicitly modeled. Given this incomplete view, the equivocal
results from the classical signaling models, both on the theoretical and the empirical
side, should not really surprise.
Based on Brick et al. (1998), we consider a debt signaling model with a moral
hazard problem stemming from an agency conßict between the manager and the owner
of the Þrm. The market cannot recognize the good and bad Þrms, which differ in their
cash ßow volatility. The Þrms are run by equally qualiÞed managers, who choose the
Þrms optimal debt level. Besides the choice of this signaling variable, the manager
of the Þrm can provide effort, which positively affects the product market returns and
thus the value of the Þrm. Providing effort is costly for the manager, and the effort
level is not directly observable. The manager, who is remunerated as a function of
the Þrms value, thus balances the costs of his effort against the increase in Þrm value.
This additional dimension of effort choice interacts with the signaling mechanism and
affects the equilibrium debt level of the Þrm. Accordingly, we need to take into account
both kind of decisions to appropriately understand the Þrms capital structure choice
as signaling mechanism.
This setup with the manager affecting the Þrms product market returns is moti-
vated by the observation that the success of most businesses heavily depends on the
personal effort with which the manager is carrying out his job duties. The Economist5,
for instance, notices in relation with share options: ,(...) a Þrst-class boss can make
so large a difference to a companys performance that almost any price is worth paying
for his services. By linking the choice of the Þnancial structure to the managers ef-
fort provision, our setup extends the classical signaling framework to a more complete
characterization of decisionmaking processes inside the Þrm.
There exist a few other papers which do not only consider dividend and debt deci-
4Brander&Lewis (1986) were the Þrst to show that capital structure choice interacts with the Þrms
output market strategy.
5See The Economist, The trouble with share options, p. 11-12, Aug 7th 1999.
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sions as signaling mechanism. Luo et al. (2002) consider a model where Þrms can use
investment decisions besides debt and dividends to convey private information to the
market. In contrast to other papers, the information asymmetry does not only refer
to the mean, but also to the variance of the cash ßow. The choice of the signals then
depends on the relative importance of these two sources of asymmetric information and
on the simultaneous strategic interactions between the use of the three instruments.
As a result, high value Þrms signal by higher investments and dividends. Contrary to
most other papers, however, the high quality Þrm does not always have the higher debt
level: a lower volatility is signaled by an increased equity share, whereas only a higher
expected cash ßow goes together with a higher leverage.
Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988) consider a two audience signaling with sig-
naling to capital and products markets. There is an informed Þrm, who Þrst issues debt
and then competes with its product market rival, who does not the level of demand.
The choice of the debt level by the informed party may not only reveal information to
the capital market but also to its uninformed rival, who adjusts his behavior depending
on the transactions it observes between the informed Þrm and the capital market. By
doing so, the uninformed Þrm affects the proÞts of the informed Þrm. The character
of the capital market equilibrium is thus determined by the structure of the product
market.
The novel aspect of this paper is that it extends the capital structure choice as
signaling mechanism to the unobservable effort choice of the manager. This additional
dimension of an agency conßict between the owner and the manager of the Þrm, which
introduces a moral hazard problem, challenges some former results of the classical
signaling models.
The main results of our paper are as follows: the good Þrm does not always choose
a lower debt level than the bad Þrm. It depends on the characteristics of the output
markets, i.e., we need to take into account the volatility of product market returns in
addition to the debt level to identify the Þrms type. This result is driven by the fact
that the manager can affect the Þrms product market returns, and it stands in contrast
with the outcomes from the classical signaling models, where there exists a monotonic
relationship between the quality of the Þrm and their debt levels. The equilibrium
effort level of the Þrms manager depends on the Þrm type as well, but is also affected
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by the output market characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows: we present the basic model in section 2. Section
3 contains the symmetric information analysis. The asymmetric information case is in
section 4. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
There are two types of Þrms i, i ∈ {H,L}, in the economy, which are either of high
quality H or of low quality L. The Þrms have the same cash ßow mean, but differ in
the variance of their cash ßow: the high quality type has a lower variance than the low
quality type. A high cash ßow variance is bad because the tax beneÞt of debt issue is
decreasing in the cash ßow variance.6
In t = 0, the Þrms can issue debt in form of bonds Bi, with Bi ≥ 0. Bi is observable.
The total payments to bondholders are tax deductible when the Þrm can make the
promised payments to bondholders. The tax beneÞt of debt issue is max{0; TBi}, i.e.,
in case the Þrm is solvent the tax beneÞt is TBi, and zero otherwise, where T is the
marginal corporate tax rate, with 0 < T < 1.7 The only reason of debt issue is to
save taxes; and it is assumed that the raised money is paid to existing shareholders.8
The interest rate is zero, the agents are risk-neutral and there are no conßicts between
stock- and bondholders.
The Þrm is run by a manager, who is hired by the owners of the Þrm. In t = 0,
after the choice of the debt level Bi, the manager of Þrm i chooses his effort level ei,
with ei ≥ 0, which directly affects the cash ßow of the Þrm. The effort level ei is not
observable. The manager incurs a cost S(ei) = βe2i , with β ∈ [0, 1], to provide effort
level ei.
These decisions together with the given investment decisions9 in t = 0 produce a
6See footnote 14.
7When the Þrm is not solvent, the due payments exceed its net income. The tax beneÞt is zero in
this case because we exclude negative corporate tax payments, which is a highly realistic assumption.
As is outlined in Brick and Fisher (1987), allowing the Þrm to unlimitedly deduce interest payments
would encourage the formation of essentially dummy corporations whose only receipts would be cor-
porate tax refunds.
8A similar approach is taken in Brander and Lewis (1986), where debt issue serves strategic reasons
only.
9We assume the manager to have no discretion over the investment decision, which we consider as
exogenous.
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stochastic cash ßow, which is realized in period t = 1. The cash ßow of Þrm i is given
by
Xi = α+ ei + ξi (1)
α ≥ 1 is the constant term of the cash ßow, and is assumed to be the same for both
Þrms. ξi is a random term which is uniformly distributed over the interval [−zi, zi],
with f(ξi) = 1/(2zi), E(ξi) = 0 and βzi > 0.25.
10 Furthermore, zL > zH , which reßects
that the L Þrm has a higher variance of the cash ßow than the H type. For simplicity,
we also assume that zL = 2zH . Outsiders of the Þrm can only observe the cash ßow
Xi.11
The expected present value of Þrm i is a function of the debt level Bi and the
managers effort level ei, net of the costs of dividend issue, and is given by (2). Li is
the insolvency point with Li = (Bi − α− ei):
Vi(Bi, ei) = (1− T )(α+ ei)+
ziZ
Li
TBif(ξi)dξi = (2)
= (1− T )(α+ ei) + TBi(α+ ei + zi −Bi)
2zi
The Þrst term of (2) represents the expected net operating income.12 It is supposed
that the effective tax rate T on net operating income is constant in all states, implying
that there is always a positive net operating income. Accordingly, the tax rate T
applies over the whole interval [−zi, zi] of ξi.13 The second term is the expected tax
beneÞt of debt issue. It only exists in case the Þrm is solvent, i.e., when the cash ßow
10This is to assure that debt and effort level are positive.
11Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998) consider the case of simultaneous debt and dividend issue as
signaling mechanisms. In contrast to other work, there is no commitment effect of dividend signaling
in the sense that Þrms are reluctant to cut dividend payments in the future, but dividend payments
are simply money-burning exercises. Therefore, we do not incorporate dividend payments in our
model, which does not affect our main results.
12Given that Xi is assumed to be always positive, the tax rate T applies over the whole interval
[−zi, zi] of ξi . Alternatively to the assumption of Xi > 0 for all values of zi,we can suppose that the
effective tax rate T on net operating income is constant in all states, implying that there will always
be a positive net operating income.
13As an alternative, we can assume that zi is such that Xi > 0 for all ξ. See, e.g., Brick, Frierman
and Kim (1998).
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Xi is sufficient to pay back the debt Bi to the bondholders.14 We assume that the Þrm
cannot go bankrupt within the considered time horizon.
The compensation of the manager is a linear function of the Þrms perceived value
in t = 0, denoted by V 0i , and of its true value in t = 1, denoted by V
1
i , i.e., the
manager obtains the fraction γ of (V 0i + V
1
i ), from which he has to deduce his costs.
15
This remuneration scheme, with 0 < γ < 1, ties the managers compensation to the
performance of the Þrm. It aligns the interests of the Þrm owner with those of the
manager.16 The compensation of the manager of Þrm i net of his effort costs is then
Wi(Vi) =Wi(Bi, ei) = γ(V
0
i + V
1
i )− S(ei) (3)
Figure 2.1 summarizes the sequence of events.
[insert Þgure 2.1 about here]
3 Symmetric information
3.1 The maximization problem
The information whether a Þrm is a high or a low quality type is publicly available in
t = 0. In the second stage, the manager of Þrm i, i = H,L, chooses his effort level ei,
when he also has to bear his private costs S(ei). He maximizes
max
ei
Wi(Bi, ei) = γ(V
0
i + V
1
i )− S(ei) (4)
= 2γ[(1− T )(α+ ei) + TBi(α+ ei + zi −Bi)
2zi
]− βe2i ,
i = H,L
14Note that the tax beneÞt of debt decreases with the variance of the cash ßow, i.e.,
∂
"
ziR
Li
TBif(ξi)dξi
#
∂zi
= TBi(Bi−(α+ei)
2z2i
≤ 0 since (α+ ei) ≥ Bi for the solvency case.
15An objective function that takes into account present and future values of the Þrm is used, for
instance, by Bhattacharya (1979). A linear compensation function for the manager can be found in
Salas Fumás (1992) or in Aggrawal and Samwick (1999).
16Note, however, that the manager does not exaclty what the owner would like. As long as γ < 1,
we are in a second-best world where the manager chooses a lower effort. This is no longer true when
γ = 1.
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The effort level ei(Bi) as a function of the debt level Bi is then
ei(Bi) =
γ[T (Bi − 2zi) + 2zi]
2βzi
(5)
In the Þrst stage, the manager maximizes Wi(Bi, ei(Bi)) = Wi(Bi) with respect to
Bi. Inserting (5) in (4) and maximizing with respect to Bi, yields the equilibrium debt
level B∗i :
B∗i =
2zi(αβ + γ(1− T ) + βzi)
(4βzi − γT ) (6)
From inserting (6) into (5), we obtain the equilibrium effort level e∗i in (7).
e∗i =
γ(zi(4− 3T ) + αT )
(4βzi − γT ) (7)
3.2 The choice of the effort level
Proposition 1 In the symmetric information case, the manager of the high quality
Þrm always chooses a higher effort level than the manager of the low quality Þrm, i.e.,
e∗H > e
∗
L.
This can best be seen by looking at the partial derivative of (4) with respect to ei,
which is the Þrst order condition of the second stage maximization problem:
∂[Wi(Bi, ei)]
∂ei
= 2γ[(1− T ) + TBi
2zi
]− 2βei (8)
Providing additional effort has two opposite effects for the compensation of the man-
ager: the Þrst term in brackets of (8) represents the positive productivity effect, as
higher effort increases the cash ßow and thus the value of the Þrm. As zi appears
in the denominator and zL > zH , this effect is lower for the L Þrm for a given value
of Bi. The second term of (8) captures the cost effect, which has a negative impact
on the managers compensation. To compensate for the lower productivity effect, the
managers of the low quality type thus provides a lower effort level.
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Proposition 2 In the symmetric information case, the effort level e∗i , for i = H,L,
increases with the fraction γ of Þrm value as compensation and decreases with the costs
of effort of the manager, i.e. ∂e∗i /∂γ > 0 and ∂e
∗
i /∂β < 0.
Proposition 2 simply reßects the effectiveness of the managers compensation schedule.
The Þrm owner can affect the managers effort level by appropriately choosing the
parameter γ. Similarly, the effort provision can be inßuenced by a lower β, resulting
from a professional training for the manager for instance .
3.3 The choice of the debt level
Proposition 3 In the symmetric information case the high quality Þrm has a higher
debt level than the low quality Þrm for low values of zH , whereas the low quality Þrm
has a higher debt level than the high quality Þrm for high values of zH , i.e., with
zL = 2zH, B∗H > B
∗
L for zH <
M
z and B∗L > B
∗
H for zH >
M
z, and , where
M
z= [3γT +p
γT (32αβ + γ(32− 23T )]/16β.
The interesting point to note is that the H type does not always choose the lower debt
level, which holds in the case without effort provision by the manager.17 Accordingly,
the additional dimension of effort provision by the manager, which interacts with the
choice of the debt level, is responsible for the absence of monotony between the debt
level and the quality of the Þrm.
To explain this, we can isolate two different effects. The Þrst effect refers to the
well known mechanism outlined in Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998): The debt level
can be considered as if the government owned a call option on the revenue of the Þrm
with exercise price B. The value of this call option is positively related to the cash
ßow variance. In order to decrease the value of the governmentss claim, the Þrm can
increase the exercise price, i.e., to increase the debt level B. Therefore, the L Þrm
chooses a higher debt level than the H Þrm. The second effect refers to the effort
provision by the manager. The marginal tax beneÞt of debt issue is increasing in the
effort level ei, i.e., ∂2TBi/∂Bi∂ ei > 0. Given proposition 1, this effect is stronger for
the H Þrm, which chooses a higher debt level.
17See Appendix for a formal derivation of the case without effort provision of the manager.
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For low values of the shock level zH , the Þrst effect is dominating, and we reach the
same result as in the case without effort provision. For higher values of zH , however,
the Þrst effect is stronger and leads to a higher leverage of the high quality Þrm. As
a consequence, it is not possible to derive the type of Þrm from its relative debt level,
but we need to take into account the absolute level of the cash ßow variability as well.
4 Asymmetric information
4.1 The maximization problem
In the asymmetric information case, managers have better information about the Þrms
performance than the market, i.e., the market does a priori not know whether a Þrm
is a high or a low quality type. This information becomes publicly available in t = 1
only.
The compensation of the manager, Wi(V oi (Bi, ), V
1
i (Bi)), is an increasing function
of the Þrms market valuation in t = 0 and in t = 1. Therefore, the manager of the
low quality Þrm has incentives to mimic the high quality Þrm in order to be perceived
as a high quality type in t = 0 and to obtain a higher compensation. The manager
of the high quality Þrm, however, can reveal its private information to the market by
choosing its debt level BH such that the low quality Þrm cannot afford mimicking its
higher valued competitor anymore.
In what follows, we are uniquely interested in the separating equilibrium of this
game. We apply the concept of sequential Nash equilibrium, which was proposed by
Milgrom and Roberts (1986). This equilibrium concept eliminates separating Nash
equilibria in which low quality Þrms deviate from their full information optimal behav-
ior. It further rules out separating equilibria with excessive and thus inefficient amounts
of signaling by the high quality Þrm. Finally, it also eliminates pooling equilibria.
In any separating equilibrium, the expected value of each Þrm has to be equal to
its actual value, i.e., V 0i (Bi) = V
1
i , for i = H,L. This is known as the competitive-
rationality condition. In a signaling equilibrium, the incentive compatibility condition
requires the compensation of both Þrms managers being maximized, subject to the
market correctly believing that each Þrms value equals its true value. Therefore, the
managers choose their debt level to correctly signal the true value of the Þrm, without
9
attempts to mimic the competitors.
In equilibrium, the low quality Þrm picks its full information optimum, i.e.,
∧
BL= B
∗
L,
whereas the high quality Þrm chooses its debt level BˆH such that it does just enough
signaling to distinguish itself from its low quality competiter. This signaling activity
involves costs for the H type Þrm, as it deviates from its full information optimal debt
level.
To derive the separating equilibrium, we proceed as follows. In the second stage,
the manager solves the same problem as in the symmetric information case, i.e., he
computes the effort level as a function of the debt level according to equation (4). The
L type, who mimics his higher valued competitor, not only has to pick BH , but he also
has to choose his effort level accordingly. Otherwise, the market can eventually deduce
the Þrms type from the signaling variable. In the Þrst stage, the manager derives
the optimal debt level, which forms a sequential Nash equilibrium of the Þrst stage
signaling game, as follows: let Wi/j denote the compensation received by the manager
of a Þrm which is of type i, but the market believes to be of type j :
Wi/j = γ[V
0
j (Bj) + V
1
i (Bj)]− S(e(Bj)) (9)
= γ[(1− T )(α+ ej) + TBj(α+ ej + zj −Bj)
2zj
+(1− T )(α+ ej) + TB(α+ ej + zi −Bj)
2zi
]− βe2j
Note that the true type of the Þrm becomes publicly known in period t = 1. Therefore,
the upper level of the shock interval zi corresponds to the true value in t = 1. The
signaling variables as well as the effort level, however, depend on the perceived type
j. As the manager determines their level in t = 0, they take the same value in both
periods.
When the manager of the low quality Þrm imitates the high quality type, his com-
pensation has to be as much as when he correctly signals the true value, i.e.,
WL/H(B)−WL/L(B∗) ≥ 0 (10)
A similar condition holds for the high quality Þrm. Let B0 denote the optimal level of
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debt in case the high quality type is perceived to be a low quality Þrm. The manager
of the high quality type has to receive a higher compensation when the Þrm is correctly
evaluated at its true value than when it is perceived as a low quality Þrm, i.e.,
WH/H(B)−WH/L(B0) ≥ 0 (11)
(10) and (11) can be combined to (12), which is the condition for the existence of a
separating equilibrium:
WH/H(B)−WH/L(B0) ≥ 0 ≥WL/H(B)−WL/L(B∗) (12)
The Þrst part of inequality (12) requires that the beneÞt of the H type manager of
being correctly perceived as a high quality Þrm is positive or equal to zero. This is
the necessary condition for the H type Þrm to signal the true quality of the Þrm and
not simply to mimic its lower valued rival. Similarly, the second part of the inequality
refers to the beneÞt of the L type manager, who does not have any incentives to mimic
the H type, as the beneÞt of mimicking would be negative or equal to zero.
To Þnd the efficient separating equilibrium point, we solve the maximization given
by (13) subject to (14). It enables the manager of the higher valued Þrm to achieve
the highest level of compensation possible without allowing the manager of the lower
valued Þrm to receive a compensation more than that given by B∗L. The manager of the
high quality Þrm chooses BH such that his compensation in (13) is maximized, subject
to the nonmimicry constraint in (14).
max
BH
γ[V 0H(BH) + V
1
H(BH)] (13)
s.t.
WL/L(B
∗
L) ≥WL/H(BH) = γ[V 0H(BH) + V 1L (BH)] (14)
The high quality Þrm chooses a debt level BˆH such that the Þrst-order condition of the
maximization problem (15) holds, i.e.,
∂V 1H
∂BH
=
∂V 1L
∂BH
(15)
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In the equilibrium of the asymmetric information case, the H type Þrm chooses its
debt level BˆH according to (16).
BˆH =
zH [αβ + γ(1− T )]
(2βzH − γT ) (16)
The L type Þrm, in contrast, chooses the same debt level as in the symmetric informa-
tion case, i.e.,
BˆL = B
∗
L =
4zH(αβ + γ(1− T ) + 2βzH)
(8βzH − γT ) (17)
The equilibrium effort levels for both Þrms are given by (18) and (19).
eˆH =
γ[(4βzH − γT )(1− T ) + Tαβ]
β(2βzH − γT ) (18)
eˆL = e
∗
L =
γ(zH(8− 6T ) + αT )
(8βzH − γT ) (19)
4.2 The choice of the effort level
Proposition 4 In the asymmetric information case, the manager of the high quality
Þrm always chooses a higher effort level than the manager of the low quality Þrm, i.e.,
eˆH > eˆL.
This result stands in line with the symmetric information case, where the manager
of the H type Þrm always chooses the higher effort level as well. It is driven by the
relative beneÞts and costs of effort provision, which the new information distribution
does not fundamentally alter.
Proposition 5 In the asymmetric information case, the manager of the high quality
Þrm provides a higher effort level for low values of zH and a lower effort level for high
values of zH compared to the symmetric information case, i.e., eˆH > e∗H for zH <
≈
z and
eˆH < e
∗
H for zH >
≈
z, where
≈
z= [γT +
p
γT (4αβ + γ(4− 3T )]/4β.
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There exists a critical value
≈
z for which e∗H and eˆH are equal. It is interesting to
compare these two outcomes because it shows the effect of using debt as signaling
mechanism on the effort provision of the manager. This observation also points out
to one source of inefficiency due to asymmetric information. When we consider the
situation with symmetric information as benchmark case, the manager of the H Þrm
chooses an inefficient effort level except for zH =
≈
z. Figure 4.1 summarizes the choice
of the effort level of both Þrms under the two informational regimes.
[insert Þgure 4.1 about here]
To fully understand this result, we also need to take into account the Þrst stage
choice of the debt level, which is outlined in the next subsection.
4.3 The choice of the debt level
The debt level is used as key signaling mechanism and can suppositionally reveal the
Þrms true value to the market. To again determine how the debt level of both Þrms and
information distributions compare to each other, we compute the following differences
in debt levels:
M B1 = BˆH − BˆL (20)
M B2 = BˆH −B∗H (21)
Proposition 6 In the asymmetric information case, the high quality Þrm has a higher
debt level than the low quality Þrm for low values of zH and a lower debt level for
high values of zH , i.e., M B1 > 0 for zH <
v
z and M B1 < 0 for zH >
v
z, and, where
v
z= γT +
p
γT (3αβ + γ(3− 2T )/4β.
The L type Þrm does, therefore, not always choose the higher debt level, but it depends
on the upper limit of the shock interval zH . Similar to the case with symmetric infor-
mation, there exists a break point
v
z, above which the H type has a relatively higher
leverage.
13
This result restricts the use of debt as signaling mechanism: it is no more possible
to differentiate the Þrms by looking at their capital structure. To know about the type
of Þrm, we additionally have to take into account the size of the cash ßow volatility,
which is captured by zH .18. We can explain this result again by the two opposing effects
of effort provision on debt issue (see Proposition 3) on the one side, and the additional
signaling dimension of debt issue on the other side.
Such an conclusion challenges the results from the setup without effort provision by
the manager, where the manager of theH type always chooses a policy of underleverage
to differentiate his Þrm from the low quality rivals.
Proposition 7 In the asymmetric information case, the high quality Þrm chooses a
policy of overleverage for low values of zH and a policy of underleverage for high values
of zH compared to the symmetric information case, i.e., M B2 > 0 for zH <
v
z and
M B2 < 0 for zH >
≈
z, where
≈
z= γT +
p
γT (4αβ + γ(4− 3T )/4β.
Proposition 7 mirrors Proposition 5 for the debt level. This result nicely shows the
interaction between debt issue and effort provision, with the identical break-point for
zH . Figure 4.2 shows the different debt levels for speciÞc parameter values.
[insert Þgure 4.2 about here]
5 Conclusions
We interpret this paper as a further contribution to explain capital structure decisions
of Þrms in a asymmetric information environment. It stresses the role of debt as
a signaling mechanism and takes explicitly into account the additional dimension of
moral hazard induced by the fact that the manager can affect the Þrms product market
returns. The work provides some insights concerning the interactions between the
signaling mechanism and the effort choice by the manager and its effects on the Þrms
Þnancial structure choice.
In contrast to former work, we Þnd that the debt level in the signaling game does
not only depend on the Þrms type, but also on factors such as the cash ßow volatility or
18Note that the size of zH is known by the parties. What is not known a priori is whether the Þrm
is a high or a low type.
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the characteristics of the managers compensation scheme. These results are driven by
the agency conßict between the manager and the owner of the Þrm. As a result, it is no
more sufficient to look at the level of the Þrms signaling variables to identify its type.
Such an outcome weakens the effectiveness of debt issue as a signaling mechanism.
More work is needed to investigate further interesting issues within this context.
One topic refers to the impact of different incentive schemes for the manager on the
signaling activity. In addition, we should allow for unequally skilled managers, which
introduces another source of heterogeneity between the Þrms. Furthermore, the model
should account for the possibility of Þrms going bankrupt during the period of consid-
eration, as debt issue affects the Þrms risk exposure. Finally, it remains an empirical
question whether our setup with this additional moral hazard problem contributes to
better understand the inconclusive picture from the empirical tests of the classical
signaling models. At least, our theoretical model may provide one source of explana-
tion for these inconclusive results. Future work should, therefore, also concentrate on
empirically testing the model with Þrm data.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The symmetric information case
6.1.1 Proof of proposition 1
Differentiating e∗i with respect to
−
zi yields
∂e∗i
∂
−
zi
=
γT [γ(3T − 4)− 4αβ]
(−γT + 4zi)2 (22)
which is always negative: the numerator is negative due to the T < 1, and the denom-
inator is always positive.
6.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
Differentiating e∗i with respect to γ yields
∂e∗i
∂γ
=
4zi[zi(4− 3T ) + αT ]
(−γT + 4βzi)2 (23)
which is always positive: The numerator is positive due to the T < 1, and the denom-
inator is positive as well.
Differentiating e∗i with respect to β yields
∂e∗i
∂β
=
2γzi[zi(3T − 4)− αT ]
(−γT + 4βzi)2 (24)
which is always negative: the numerator is negative due to the T < 1, and the denom-
inator is positive.
6.2 The asymmetric information case
6.2.1 The maximization problem
As is outlined in section 4.1, the following equality has to hold:
∂V 1H
∂BH
=
∂V 1L
∂BH
(25)
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where
V 1H = γ(1− T )(α+
γ(2zH(1− T ) + TBH)
2βzH
+
γTB1(α+
γ(2zH(1−T )+TBH)
2βzH
2zH
(26)
+
zH −BH
2zH
− γ
2(2zH(1− T ) + TBH)2
4βz2H
∂V 1H
∂BH
=
γT (α+ zH − 2BH
2zH
(27)
and
V 1L = γ(1− T )(α+
γ(2zH(1− T ) + TBH)
2βzH
+ (28)
+
γTBH(α+
γ(2zH(1−T )+TBH)
2βzH
+ 0.5zH −BH
zH
− γ
2(2zH(1− T ) + TBH)2
4βz2H
∂V 1L
∂BH
=
γT [(T − 1)γzH + αβzH − γTBH + 2βzH(zH −BH)]
4βzH
(29)
∂V 1H
∂BH
− ∂V
1
L
∂BH
=
γT [γzH(1− T ) + γTBH + βzH(α+ 2zHBH)]
4βz2H
(30)
Solving (30) for BH yields
BˆH =
zH [αβ + γ(1− T )]
(2βzH − γT ) (31)
6.2.2 Proof of existence of the equilibrium
For some B :
WH/H(B, e)−WH/L(B0, e) ≥ 0 ≥WL/H(B, e)−WL/L(B∗L, e) (32)
Equation (32) holds by assuming B = B∗H . In this case, we need to show that each
of the following three equations hold:
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WH/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WH/L(B0, e0) ≥ 0 (33)
WL/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WL/L(B∗L, e∗L) ≤ 0 (34)
WH/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WH/L(B0, e0)− (35)
[WL/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WL/L(B∗L, e∗L)] ≥ 0
B0 and e0and are the debt and effort levels which maximizeWH/L(B, e). To Þnd the
corresponding values of B0 and e0, we take the derivative of WH/L(B, e) with respect
to e,set it equal to zero and solve for e(B), plug it in again inWH/L, take the derivative
with respect to B, set it equal to zero and solve for B = B0. We then Þnd e = e0 by
substituting B = B0 in e(B) :
WH/L(B
0, e0) = γ[(1− T )(α+ e0) + TB
0(α+ e0 + 2zH −B0)
4zH
(36)
+γ[(1− T )(α+ e0) + TB
0(α+ e0 + zH −B0)
2zH
− β(e0)2
∂WH/L(B
0, e0)
∂e0
= γ(1− T + TB
0
4zH
) + γ(1− T + TB
0
2zH
)− 2βe0 != 0 (37)
e0(B0) =
γ(8zH − 8TzH + 3TB0
βzH
(38)
∂WH/L(B
0, e0(B0))
∂B0
=
γT (24γzH(1− T + αβ) + 9γTB0 + 32βz2H − 48βzHB0)
32βz2H
(39)
B0 =
8zH(3γ(1− T ) + 3αβ + 4βzH)
3(16βzH − 3γT ) (40)
e0 =
γ(16zH − 12TzH + 3αT )
(16βzH − 3γT ) (41)
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WH/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WH/L(B0, e0) = (42)
γTzH(12α
2β2 + 24αβγ − 18αβγT + 12γ2 − 18γ2T
3(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT )) +
6γ2T 2 − 16β2z2H + 7βγTzH
3(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT ))
WL/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WL/L(B∗L, e∗L) = (43
γTzH [16α
2β3zH + αβγzH(32β − 24βT )− β2z2H(48β − 30γT )
2(8βzH − γT )(4βzH − γT )2
+
βγzH(3T
2 + 16− 24T )− αβγT (6αβ + 12γ − 9γT )
2(8βzH − γT )(4βzH − γT )2
− γ
3T (6− 9T )]
2(8βzH − γT )(4βzH − γT )2
WH/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WH/L(B0, e0)− (44)
[WL/H(B
∗
H , e
∗
H)−WL/L(B∗L, e∗L)] =
γTzH [β
2z2H(1280β
2z2H − 1040βγTzH + 310γ2T 2)
6(8βzH − γT )(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT )2
+
αβ2γTzH(144αβ + 288γ − 216γT )
6(8βzH − γT )(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT )2
+
βγ3TzH(41T
2 − 216T + 144)
6(8βzH − γT )(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT )2
+
αβγ2T 2(45γT − 30αβ − 60γ) + γ4T 2(45T − 30− 15T 2)]
6(8βzH − γT )(16βzH − 3γT )(4βzH − γT )2
(42), (43) and (44) hold for the possible parameter values.
6.2.3 Proof of proposition 3
B∗H −B∗L =
2zH(αβγT + γ
2T (1− T ) + 3βγTzH − 8β2z2H)
(4βzH − γT )(8βzH − γT ) (45)
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which is positive for the possible parameter values.
B∗H −B∗L = 0 for a value of zH =
M
z, B∗H −B∗L > 0 for zH <
M
z, and B∗H −B∗L < 0 for
zH >
M
z, where
M
z=
3γT +
p
γT (32αβ + γ(32− 23T )
16β
(46)
6.2.4 Proof of proposition 4
eˆH − eˆL = γT (γ
2T + 4βγzH − γ2T − 8β2z2H + αβγT + 4αβ2zH)
2β(2βzH − γT )(8βzH − γT ) (47)
which is positive for the possible parameter values.
6.2.5 Proof of proposition 5
eˆH − e∗H =
γT (γ2T (1− T ) + 2βγTzH − 4β2z2H + αβγT )
2β(2βzH − γT )(4βzH − γT ) (48)
eˆH − e∗H = 0 for a value of zH =
≈
z, eˆH − e∗H > 0 for zH <
≈
z, and eˆH − e∗H < 0 for zH >
≈
z,
where
≈
z=
γT +
p
γT (4αβ + 4γ − 3γT )
4β
(49)
6.2.6 Proof of proposition 6
BˆH − BˆL = zH(3γ
2T (1− T ) + 8βγTzH + 3αβγT − 16β2z2H
(2βzH − γT )(8βzH − γT ) (50)
BˆH − BˆL = 0 for a value of zH =∼z, BˆH − BˆL > 0 for zH <∼z, and BˆH − BˆL < 0 for
zH >
∼
z, where
∼
z=
γT +
p
γ2T (3− 2T ) + 3αβγT
4β
(51)
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6.2.7 Proof of proposition 7
BˆH −B∗H =
zH(γ
2T 2 − γ2T − 2βγTzH − αβγT + 4β2z2H)
(2βzH − γT )(4βzH − γT ) (52)
BˆH − B∗H = 0 for a value of zH =
≈
z, BˆH − B∗H > 0 for zH <
≈
z, and BˆH − B∗H < 0 for
zH >
≈
z, where
≈
z=
γT +
p
γT (4αβ + 4γ − 3γT )
4β
(53)
6.3 Exogenous product market returns
6.3.1 The symmetric information case without effort
When we consider the case of exogenous product market return, i.e., the manager is not
able to affect the Þrms cash ßow by providing any effort, the maximization problem
looks as follows:
max
Bi
Vi(Bi) = (1− T )(α)+
ziZ
Li
TBif(ξi)dξi = (1− T )(α) +
TBi(α+ zi −Bi)
2zi
(54)
The Þrst-order condition is
∂Vi(Bi)
∂Bi
T (α+ zi + 2Bi)
2zi
= 0 (55)
which yields the equilibrium debt
∼
Bi=
α+ zi
2
(56)
6.3.2 The asymmetric information case without effort
The maximization problem of the case with asymmetric information reduces to
max
Bi
γ[V 01 (B1) + V
1
1 (B1)] (57)
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subject to
C2/2(B
∗
2) ≥ C2/1(B1) = γ[V 01 (B1) + V 12 (B1)] (58)
where
V 01 = (1− T )α+
T
2zH
[(α+ zH)B −B2], V 11 = (1− T )α+
T
2zH
[(α+ zH)B −B2] (59)
and
V 12 = (1− T )α+
T
2zL
[(α+ zL)B −B2] (60)
This maximization problem reduces to
∂V 11
∂B
=
∂V 12
∂B
(61)
where
∂V 11
∂B
=
T
2zH
[(α+ zH)− 2B) (62)
∂V 12
∂B
=
T
2zL
[(α+ zL)− 2B) (63)
Equalizing (63) and (64) leads to
α+ zH − 2B
zH
=
α+ zL − 2B
zL
(64)
Solving for B yields
≈
B1=
α
2
(65)
The low quality Þrm chooses the same value of B than in the symmetric information
case, i.e.,
∼
B2=
≈
B2 .
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Figure 4.2. Equilibrium effort levels 
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